EPISTEMIC VICES OF DIGITAL GUIDES

Authors

  • TARIK TUNA GÖZÜTOK
  • ALİ FURKAN ARICIOĞLU

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.47333/modernizm.2022.75

Keywords:

Artificial Intelligence, Gettier problem, Virtue Epistemology, Knowledge, Justification

Abstract

In this paper, we claim that relying on digital guides such as artificial intelligence or learning machines in justification of knowledge is problematic from the perspective of virtue epistemology. To the latter, the virtues which we are supposed to follow during knowledge acquisition should become habits, so intrinsic elements of character, for the actor of knowledge act without considering the particular results of acts of knowledge. Nevertheless, in comparison with conventional guides, digital guides are taken as more reliable, used more easily and more commonly, and this promotes the actors to develop a habit to violate certain epistemic virtues. To support this claim, first, we looked at the debate around justification problem in the last century and showed that virtue epistemology was offered as a solution to the problem of justification. Then we exemplified conventional guides, which are analytic guides and scientific guides, and digital guides, use of which we aimed to discuss in the context of epistemic virtues. At the end, we discussed why it is problematic from the vantage point of epistemic virtues to draw upon digital guides as we do right now.

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Published

2022-12-31

How to Cite

GÖZÜTOK, T. T., & ARICIOĞLU, A. F. (2022). EPISTEMIC VICES OF DIGITAL GUIDES. JOURNAL OF MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM STUDIES (JOMOPS), 3(2). https://doi.org/10.47333/modernizm.2022.75